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ABSTRACT 
A steadily growing portion of modern communication systems in use 
today is based on wireless technologies that make use of smaller and more 
portable electronic devices. As a result, the need to provide a light-weight 
security strategy for these systems is becoming a more important problem. 
This thesis focuses on two techniques that belong to an active research area 
known as Physical Layer Security (PLS). While the underlying techniques of 
PLS have been known for some time, the potential secrecy benefits of them 
need further investigation. These potential benefits have generated a rising 
interest with the development of Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) 
multi-antenna systems. The first PLS technique considered in this thesis is 
that of beamforming which is made possible using MIMO. Here a sender 
can focus the information signal in the direction of the intended receiver 
while reducing the quality of the signal observed by a potential 
eavesdropper. In addition to beamforming, the technique of artificial noise 
(AN) is also investigated. AN requires the sender to generate a random noise 
signal in addition to the information signal to further degrade an 
eavesdropper’s ability to detect and decode the information signal being 
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directed to the intended receiver. MATLAB simulations based on these PLS 
techniques are performed and the results presented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Physical Layer Security Explained 
The need to deliver secure communications utilizing wireless systems is an 
increasingly complex challenge given both the broadcast nature of the wireless medium 
and the rapid advancements in technology available to potential eavesdroppers as shown 
in Figure 1-1: Typical Eavesdropper Scenario. To meet this challenge, system designers 
have traditionally leveraged cryptography implemented at the upper layers of the protocol 
stack. The computational resource-intensive nature of cryptography-based security 
however does not scale well when employed in devices which are continuously growing 
smaller in size and have reduced power constraints. Lighter weight security 
implementations will be needed for this new generation of smaller devices, especially as 
the proliferation of Internet of Things devices continues at an ever-increasing rate.  
Physical Layer Security is an increasingly important research area in wireless 
communications. PLS is a collection of different security techniques that seek to exploit 
the random nature of wireless channels to either obscure the information being exchanged 
over the channel and/or provide a mechanism to generate private keys that can then be 
used to facilitate encrypted communications. This thesis focuses on the potential benefits 
of two areas of active PLS research, which are beamforming and artificial noise. 
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Figure 1-1: Typical Eavesdropper Scenario. 
The concept of providing a level of secrecy to wireless communications is based 
on a field of study known as information theory, which was first introduced in a paper 
published by Claude Shannon in 1949 [1]. Among the ground-breaking ideas presented in 
this paper was the notion of perfect secrecy using a secret key-based cypher system 
shown in Figure 1-2. 
 
Figure 1-2: Shannon’s Cipher System Model. 
In Shannon’s Cipher Model, the sender Alice encrypts a message 𝑀 using a secret 
key 𝐾 which is known to Bob but not the eavesdropper Eve. Since this model is 
3 
 
 
 
pessimistic, meaning it assumes the system contains no noise, both Bob and Eve receive 
the same cryptogram 𝑋. Bob can use the secret key 𝐾 to decrypt the cryptogram to obtain 
?̂?, which is a matching estimation of the original message 𝑀. Eve, on the other hand, is 
left to only guess the components of the original message since she has no knowledge of 
𝐾.  
Information theory provides a means to determine the capacity limits of 
communication systems. If a system can be designed such that the communication 
capacity between a sender and an intended receiver is measurably greater than that 
between the sender and a potential eavesdropper, the difference between their channel 
capacities will yield a measurable secrecy capacity where the eavesdropper is only able to 
detect and decode a portion of the overall original information signal. It is this concept 
that forms the basis of PLS. 
Many recent developed wireless communication standards have incorporated 
MIMO technology. Using MIMO, system designers not only have found a means to 
engineer platforms that can provide system users with improved signal performance, but 
an even more interesting possibility of enhancing overall secrecy by exploiting the 
random nature of multi-channel MIMO systems. 
In this thesis two different PLS techniques, namely beamforming and artificial 
noise generation, are investigated through a series of MATLAB simulations to better 
understand the potential secrecy benefits provided through the application of these 
techniques. The technique of beamforming can be broken down into two categories. The 
first is transmit beamforming, which involves the use of phase shifts of the transmitted 
signals across multiple antennas to focus the transmitted signals toward an intended 
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receiver while reducing the signal level transmitted in other directions. The second, called 
receive beamforming, makes use of spatial diversity to process the various received 
signals from multiple receive antennas resulting in an increased SNR at the receiver. The 
potential transmitter power reduction benefits from RX beamforming through Maximal 
Ratio Combining is also considered. Artificial noise generation is also analyzed to 
investigate its impact on secrecy between a transmitter and an intended receiver by 
generating additional artificial noise that is directed in directions other that of the 
intended receiver. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Information-Theoretic Secrecy 
2.1.1 Fundamentals of Information Security 
In this section, the relevant background information within the topics of the 
information theory and MIMO communications are presented. These two topics are 
building blocks for PLS and the related PLS techniques investigated in this thesis. 
The principles behind a receiver detecting a signal and successfully decoding it 
are rooted in information theory. Many of the principles in information theory involve 
random variables and their various outcome probabilities. Like a coin flip with its two 
possible outcomes being heads or tails, digital communication systems involve 
determining whether a 0 or a 1 was sent across a channel. A traditional model used to 
depict the probabilities of the outcomes associated with a communication system is that 
of the Binary Symmetric Channel shown in Figure 2-1 [2]. 
The outcome of the BSC is a random variable with two possible outcomes, 0 or 1. 
This model simplifies the depiction of information being passed through a channel with 
potential for errors. The probability of making an incorrect estimation of the original 
value is represented by F. The error probability F is related to effects the actual physical 
communication channel has on the signals being passed through it. 
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Figure 2-1: Binary Symmetric Channel Model. 
2.1.2 Error Correction Coding 
Since it is impractical to remove all source of errors from a communication 
system, system designers must implement solutions to compensate for them. A common 
technique known as error correction coding implements a coding scheme that can reduce 
the number of potential errors by adding in a level of redundancy into the encoded 
information or codeword [3]. A model for an error correction coding system is presented 
in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2: Error Correction Coding System Diagram. 
The sender provides the original source information bits to the encoder that in 
turn maps the source information to a codeword that adds several redundant bits to the 
source bits. After the data is then passed through the noisy channel, the potential for error 
is presented. However, due to the redundant bits added by the encoder before 
transmission, the decoder removes the bits added for redundancy and the original source 
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information bits are recovered by the receiver. The presence of the redundant bits allows 
the decoder to overcome potential information bit errors. A common approach for error 
correction coding is to surround a single information bit with redundant identical bits, i.e. 
a single 0 source information bit may be encoded as 000 to increase the probability of a 
correct estimation of the original source bit 0 by the decoder. The spectral efficiency of 
the coding scheme is represented by the coding rate 𝑅 which is defined as 
 𝑅 =
𝐾
𝑁
 Eq. 2-1 
where 𝐾 represents the amount of source bits within the code compared to the total length 
of the code in bits represented by 𝑁. 
2.1.3 Wyner’s Wiretap Channel 
In 1975, Wyner introduced a concept that is at the foundation of PLS called the 
wiretap channel model [4]. In this model, the wiretapper (referred to as the eavesdropper) 
attempts to intercept the information being passed between legitimate users by “tapping” 
the main channel between the users by means of a “wiretap” channel. During periods 
when the intended receiver’s channel is “more reliable” than that of the eavesdropper, 
there is a measurable amount of information that can be securely shared between the 
sender and the intended receiver. Under this model, secrecy is solely provided by the 
exploitation of the random properties of the eavesdropper’s wiretap channel. In [4], 
Wyner presented two cases of the wiretap channel, namely the special case and the 
general case.  
Under the special case shown in Figure 2-3, the sender and the intended receiver 
communicates over a noiseless channel. The eavesdropper also receives the same 
communication through a memoryless BSC. The encoder is fed blocks of K bits from the 
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source represented as 𝑆𝐾 = (𝑆1,∙∙∙, 𝑆𝐾) which encodes 𝑆
𝐾 into a binary 𝑁 vector 𝑋𝑁 =
(𝑋1,∙∙∙, 𝑋𝑁) with length 𝑁. Wyner’s wiretap channel considers error probability, 
transmission rate, and equivocation rate as important parameters. 
 
Figure 2-3: Wyner Wiretap Channel (special case) [4]. 
The error probability is  
 𝑃𝑒 =
1
𝐾
∑ 𝑃𝑟 {𝑆𝐾 ≠ ?̂?𝐾}
𝐾
𝐾=1
. Eq. 2-2 
The encoded sequence 𝑋𝑁 is seen by the eavesdropper through the BSC (i.e. the 
wiretap channel). The bit flip probability is 𝑝0(0 <  𝑝0 ≤ 
1
2
). The output sequence 
through the wiretap channel 
 𝑍𝑁 = (𝑍1,∙∙∙, 𝑍𝑁). Eq. 2-3 
The channel’s transmission rate is  
 𝑅 =
𝐾
𝑁
 Eq. 2-4 
measured in source bits per transmitted symbol. The equivocation rate which represents 
the degree of confusion on the part of the eavesdropper is defined as  
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 ∆ =  
1
𝐾
𝐻(𝑆𝐾|𝑍𝑁). Eq. 2-5 
The objective is for the channel to provide a low error probability, high 
transmission rate along with a high equivocation rate.  
Under the general case of Wyner’s wiretap channel, the source’s entropy is 𝐻𝑆 
and the main and wiretap channels are discrete and memoryless. Their respective 
transition probabilities are 𝑄𝑀 and 𝑄𝑊,respectively. The error probability and the 
equivocation rate of the general case match those of the special case, however, the 
transmission rate does not. The transmission rate for the general case of Wyner’s wiretap 
channel now includes the entropy of the source 𝐻𝑆. This results in the transmission rate 
for the general case being defined as  
 𝑅 =  
𝐾𝐻𝑠
𝑁
 Eq. 2-6 
in source bits per transmitted symbol. As depicted in Figure 2-4, the source sends a 
binary message SK through an encoder which produces a codeword XN containing N bits. 
The codeword passes through the main channel where it is exposed to noise and other 
sources of error before being received as YN at the desired receiver. However, the 
eavesdropper receives an even greater degraded sample of YN through the wiretap 
channel resulting in ZN being presented at the eavesdropper. It is important to consider 
that the wiretap channel ignores any assumptions about the computational capability of 
the eavesdropper and there are no actual encryption keys being exchanged between the 
sender and the intended receiver. The wiretap channel model relies solely on the 
parameters of the wireless channels themselves. 
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Figure 2-4: Wyner Wiretap Channel (general case) [4]. 
2.1.4 Wyner’s Equivocation-Rate Region 
In [4], Wyner presents a secrecy capacity region R̅ depicted here in Figure 2-5 for 
a pairing of transmission and equivocation rates (R, d). The rate R represents the rate that 
reliable communication can occur between Alice and Bob while the equivocation d is the 
level of confusion Eve experiences based on her observations of the communication 
message [5]. The region is defined as 
 R̅ ≜ {(R, d):  0 ≤ R ≤ CM, 0 ≤ d ≤ Hs, Rd ≤ HsΓ(R)} Eq. 2-7 
The points on R̅ where 
 R = CM Eq. 2-8 
outline where the transmission rate approaches the channel capacity for the main channel 
𝑄𝑀 in Wyner’s wiretap channel model. For points that lie along 
 d = Hs Eq. 2-9 
represent a situation where the eavesdropper’s equivocation approaches Hs corresponding 
to perfect secrecy [4]. The points along the line Cs represent the secrecy capacity of the 
channel pair (𝑄𝑀, 𝑄𝑊) which are the main channel and the wiretap channel in Wyner’s 
wiretap channel model. Wyner points out that a wiretap equivocation near 
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HsΓ(CM)
CM
 Eq. 2-10 
is achievable at this rate. Note that an increased equivocation requires a decreased 
transmission rate [4]. The point on R̅ where the reliable transmission rate 
 R = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W) Eq. 2-11 
is equal to the equivocation rate  
 Re = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W|Zn) Eq. 2-12 
where W is the message from Alice to Bob and Zn contains the Eve’s observations. This 
rate represents the highest rate that Eve gains no information at the message W. Wyner 
shows that when the input probability distribution is optimized, a maximum difference in 
mutual information is possible, represented as 
 Γ(R) = sup𝑝𝑥∈𝑃(𝑅)I(X; Y|Z). Eq. 2-13 
The point on Γ(Cs) is the point at which the maximum transmission rate at which 
perfect secrecy is achieved [6]. 
12 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Wyner Achievable Wiretap Code Region [4]. 
2.1.5 Information Measurements 
The measure of average information within a discrete random variable X having a 
probability distribution pX is known as the entropy of X expressed as 
 H(X) = −∑p(x) log p(x)
x∈X
 Eq. 2-14 
and is sometimes referred to as the degree of uncertainty about X [7]. Entropy is a 
fundamental concept of information theory and physical layer security [2]. 
Given two discrete random variables X and Y having a joint probability 
distribution pXY, the joint entropy of X and Y is 
13 
 
 
 
 H(X, Y) = −∑∑p(x, y) log p(x, y)
y∈Yx∈X
 Eq. 2-15 
and is representative of the degree of uncertainty regarding X and Y. Conditional entropy 
is the degree of uncertainty of X given Y and is defined as 
 H(X|Y) = −∑∑p(x, y) log p(x|y)
y∈Yx∈X
 Eq. 2-16 
Now that the concepts of entropy and conditional entropy have been introduced, 
the concept of mutual information can be presented. Mutual information represents a 
measure of the information which one random variable conveys about a different random 
variable.  
For example, if Y is a sequence of observations made, the amount of information 
provided about a random variable X would yield an amount of information about X given 
Y. This is defined as 
 I(X; Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y). Eq. 2-17 
As a result of symmetry, the following definition of 
 I(X; Y) = H(Y) − H(Y|X) Eq. 2-18 
also exists. In addition, it is worth noting that  
 I(X; Y) = I(Y; X). Eq. 2-19 
Building on this definition of mutual information, its relation to secrecy can be 
considered. The secrecy capacity [5] of the general wiretap channel is denoted as 
 Cs = maxp(u,x)
I(X; Y) − I(X; Z) Eq. 2-20 
which defines the maximization of the mutual information difference between the mutual 
information between Alice and Bob and the mutual information between Alice and Eve. 
In addition, a DMC [2] capacity can be defined as  
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 C =  maxp(x)
 I(X; Y). Eq. 2-21 
Under the weak secrecy constraint, the information transferred per-symbol must 
go to zero [8]. If Xn represents an encoded bit stream of length n sent by Alice and Zn is 
the information observed by Eve, weak secrecy is given as 
 lim
n→∝
 
1
n
I(Xn; Zn) = 0. Eq. 2-22 
The strong secrecy constraint, however, requires that the entire information 
transferred to an eavesdropper goes to zero [8] and is defined as 
 lim
n→∝
I(Xn; Zn) = 0. Eq. 2-23 
2.2 Multiple Input Multiple Output Wireless Communications 
2.2.1 MIMO Benefits 
Many wireless networks of today leverage MIMO multi-antenna array 
technology. The initial benefits gained from MIMO centered around increased data rates 
and increased SNR at distant receivers as a result of focusing the wireless signal in the 
direction of the intended receiver, i.e. beamforming.  
MIMO systems can deliver significant performance improvements over 
traditional single antenna systems [9]. These improvements are attributed to various 
gains, namely array, diversity, and spatial multiplexing, as well as interference reduction. 
2.2.2 Array Gain 
An increase in average received SNR can be realized from array gain. Array gain 
involves adaptive processing utilizing multiple antennas to create a coherent combining 
effect [9]. The processing can be implemented by the transmitter and/or receiver. Channel 
state information knowledge at the transmitter or receiver is necessary for array gain. 
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Another factor is the total number of antennas employed at the transmitter and receiver. It 
is more practical to have CSI at the receiver than at the transmitter since obtaining CSIT 
requires a higher level of complexity in the system [10]. 
2.2.3 Diversity Gain 
Diversity gain provides the benefit of increased resiliency against the negative 
effects of channel fading. Techniques used to achieve diversity gain are typically either 
spatial diversity or time/frequency diversity [9]. Spatial diversity is achieved using 
multiple antennas (i.e. multiple propagation paths), where the signal transmitted and 
received on each antenna can be combined to offset the fluctuations in signal power 
caused by fading. In the case of time/frequency diversity, additional transmission time or 
increased bandwidth is required since the information being sent must be sent over 
additional timeslots and/or frequencies.  
2.2.4 Interference Resistance 
Resistance to interference can be improved using MIMO as well. By processing 
the received signals received on each receive antenna, multi-antenna receivers can better 
filter out unwanted signals resulting from users of shared or reused channels [11]. 
However, to facilitate such selectivity, the receiver must have some level of channel 
knowledge for the signals it wants to preserve while minimizing all others [9]. 
2.2.5 Spatial Multiplexing 
A multi-antenna system can also increase its information throughput compared to 
that of a SISO system since multiple antennas can be used to send separate bit streams 
across each antenna, utilizing parallel propagation paths and multiple channels. This is 
referred to as spatial multiplexing [12]. In this scenario, the receiver receives the multiple 
16 
 
 
 
data sequences and performs a merge of them allowing for an increase in spectral 
efficiency. For example, a MIMO system with three transmit antennas and three receive 
antennas would provide a three times improvement over a standard SISO system in terms 
of throughput. 
There are four fundamental system models used when analyzing wireless 
communication systems, including MIMO. They are SISO, SIMO, MISO, and MIMO. 
2.2.6 Single Input Single Output 
The most basic antenna configuration is the SISO model as shown in Figure 2-6. 
In a SISO system, there exists a single transmit antenna and a single receive antenna. 
SISO provides no array gain or diversity gain since it is limited to a single propagation 
path. 
 
Figure 2-6: Single Input Single Output 1 x 1 System Model. 
2.2.7 Single Input Multiple Output 
A SIMO system like the one depicted in Figure 2-7, incorporates multiple 
antennas at the receiver while maintaining a single antenna at the transmitter. With 
SIMO, the receiver must implement any multi-antenna processing techniques. To 
enhance the received signal strength, one option the receiver has is to utilize a voting 
strategy by which the signals detected by the various receive antennas are compared and 
the receiver can choose to process the instance with the strongest SNR. A second 
approach known as Maximal Ratio Combining involves the receiver combining the 
17 
 
 
 
signals received on each separate antenna in a manner that yields an increased overall 
SNR [13]. MRC is among the techniques further investigated in this thesis to better 
evaluate its potential for allowing reduced transmitter power while maintaining a desired 
SNR at the receiver. 
 
Figure 2-7: Single Input Multiple Output 1 x 2 System Model. 
2.2.8 Multiple Input Single Output 
Figure 2-8 presents the model for a 2 x 1 MISO system where the multiple 
antennas are now on the transmitter side of the system while the receiver has been 
reduced to using a single antenna. A common technique used in a MISO system is 
transmit beamforming allowing the transmitter to focus the power of the information 
signal in the direction of the desired receiver(s).  
 
Figure 2-8: Multiple Input Single Output 2 x 1 System Model. 
2.2.9 Multiple Input Multiple Output 
The fourth and final model is shown in Figure 2-9 and it is the MIMO system. 
The model depicted here is a 2 x 2 system where the transmitter and the receiver each 
have dual antennas resulting in a total of four wireless channels between them.  
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The MIMO model provides the highest increase in data rate compared to the 
previous models presented. 
 
Figure 2-9: Multiple Input Multiple Output 2 x 2 System Model. 
2.2.10 MIMO Channel 
Considering a single-user MIMO channel with flat-fading, the channel model is 
defined as  
 𝐲 = 𝐇𝐱 + 𝐧. Eq. 2-24 
Here, 𝐲 represents the 𝑀𝑅 x 1 received signal vector, 𝐇 represents the 𝑀𝑅 x 𝑀𝑇 
channel matrix containing the complex channel gains between the transmit and receive 
antennas, 𝐱 represents the 𝑀𝑇 x 1 transmitted signal vector and finally 𝐧 represents the 
𝑀𝑅 x 1 AWGN vector [14]. It is common to assume flat-fading when analyzing wireless 
systems as this assumption serves to simplify the analysis. 
2.2.11 Singular Value Decomposition 
The channel capacity of a MIMO system can be obtained using a linear algebra 
analysis technique known as Singular Value Decomposition [15]. SVD provides a 
mechanism such that the MIMO channel matrix 𝐇 can be decomposed into several 
parallel spatially-diverse SISO channels. Figure 2-10 depicts the SVD process for a 
MIMO system. The total number of channels resulting from the decomposition of 𝐇 is 
equal to the rank of 𝐇. Given a MIMO channel model 
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 𝐲 = 𝐇𝐱 + 𝐧, Eq. 2-25 
the SVD of 𝐇 is 
 𝐇 = 𝐔𝚽𝐕H Eq. 2-26 
where 𝐔 is the 𝑀𝑅 x 𝑀𝑅 unitary matrix, 𝐕 is the 𝑀𝑇 x 𝑀𝑇 unitary matrix, and Φ is the 
𝑀𝑅 x 𝑀𝑇 diagonal matrix consisting of singular values of matrix 𝐇 in descending order 
[16]. 
 𝚽 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝛌𝟏 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝛌𝟐 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 ⋱ ⋯ ⋮
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝝀𝑴−𝟏 𝟎
𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝛌𝐌]
 
 
 
 
 Eq. 2-27 
where λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ λM−1 ≥ λM. Given CSIT exists, a precoding scheme can be 
applied to the information data stream vector 𝐱 prior to transmission such that the 
transmitted symbols are 
 𝐬 = 𝐕𝐱 Eq. 2-28 
The resulting received signal vector 𝐳 is comprised of a post-multiplication of 𝐲 
and 𝐔H such that 
 𝐳 = 𝐔H𝐲 Eq. 2-29 
and to simplify further 
 𝐳 = 𝐔H(𝐇𝐬 + 𝐧) Eq. 2-30 
 
 𝐳 = 𝐔H(𝐇(𝐕𝐱) + 𝐧) Eq. 2-31 
 
 𝐳 = 𝐔H(𝐔𝚽𝐕H(𝐕𝐱) + 𝐧) Eq. 2-32 
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 𝐳 = 𝐔H(𝐔𝚽𝐕H(𝐕𝐱) + 𝐧) Eq. 2-33 
 
 𝐳 = 𝚽𝐱 + 𝐔H𝐧 Eq. 2-34 
 
 𝐳 = 𝚽𝐱 + ?̅?. Eq. 2-35 
 
Figure 2-10: SVD Decomposition of MIMO Channel [15]. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY 
 
3.1 Physical Layer Security Overview 
Physical Layer Security is an active research topic that aims to provide an 
increased level of security in communications systems outside of traditional 
computational security methods based on cryptography. PLS stands to provide the most 
benefit from a security perspective in the area of wireless communications due to the 
secrecy concerns resulting from the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. Researchers 
seek to better understand the degree of secrecy that can be realized through PLS by 
exploiting the physical properties of wireless channels. Traditionally in wireless 
communications, the random nature of wireless channels resulting from noise, fading, 
and interference were viewed as negative, degrading effects [17]. However, PLS can 
leverage these effects to provide a more favorable channel to an intended receiver while 
ensuring a degraded, less desirable channel to a potential eavesdropper.  
With the arrival of Multiple Input Multiple Output technologies, the interest in 
PLS has been steadily increasing over the past decade or so. MIMO, which was presented 
in the previous chapter, provides system designers with additional channels to work with 
as a result of the presence of multiple transmit and receive antennas. Using these 
additional channels, PLS provides a means to not only focus the energy of information 
bearing signals in the direction of an intended receiver but can also leverage these 
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channels to obscure the information bearing signal from eavesdroppers. MIMO combined 
with PLS techniques have garnered much consideration as an improved security strategy 
for smaller devices. Lighter weight security implementations will be needed for next 
generation smaller devices, especially in IoT, where extreme power limitations prevent 
the use of traditional computationally complex encryption algorithms.  
This chapter discusses PLS in more depth including where the physical layer fits 
into the larger data communication protocol architecture and presents various PLS 
techniques based on multi-antenna systems. 
3.2 The TCP/IP Protocol Layered Architecture 
Modern digital communication protocols are fundamentally based on a layered 
protocol architecture (or stack) known as the Open Systems Interconnect model. Under 
the OSI reference model, each layer provides specific functionality which serves the 
adjacent layers. A derivative of the OSI model is the TCP/IP protocol suite shown in 
Figure 3-1. As shown, the TCP/IP stack consists of the following five layers (from top to 
bottom): Application, Transport, Network, Data Link, and Physical. 
 
Figure 3-1: TCP/IP Communications Protocol Stack. 
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3.2.1 Application Layer 
The Application layer is the most familiar since the various computer applications 
users interact with communicate at this layer, such as web browsers, email programs, and 
video conferencing programs. This layer serves as the “doorway” by which user 
applications share data over a communication network. 
3.2.2 Transport Layer 
The Transport layer helps to ensure reliable communication occurs. It provides 
connection-oriented and connectionless-oriented communications between hosts. 
Sessions between communicating hosts are tracked and managed at this layer ensuring 
incoming datagrams are delivered to the appropriate application through the layer above. 
3.2.3 Network Layer 
The task of routing packets of data across communication networks is the primary 
function of the Network layer. This layer utilizes IP addressing to determine the source 
and destination of data packets and forwards the packets through the network determining 
and utilizing the most efficient path available. 
3.2.4 Data Link Layer 
The layer directly beneath the Network layer is the known as the Data Link layer. 
At this layer, the primary concern is controlling access onto the communication medium 
[18] similar in manner to traffic signals at an intersection. Network congestion is 
managed at this layer. The network medium would experience significant packet 
collisions resulting in high error rates without this layer. 
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3.2.5 Physical Layer 
The Physical layer provides an interface between the upper layer protocols and 
the physical communication medium such as electrical, optical, wireless, etc. The 
encoding and transmission of data over the medium is the main purpose of the PHY layer 
[18].  
Figure 3-2 depicts security mechanisms which are commonly applied at the 
layers above the PHY layer. However, the PHY layer was not considered when the 
current security schemes, based on cryptographic techniques, were developed. PLS aims 
to address this lack of security at the PHY layer in the overall goal of achieving a 
complete security architecture with secrecy components present at every layer. 
 
Figure 3-2: Security Implemented at Upper TCP/IP Layers. 
3.3 Physical Layer Security Multi-Antenna Techniques 
3.3.1 PLS Techniques Discussed 
This section presents a four PLS techniques that utilize multiple antennas, two of 
which are further investigated in future chapters. These PLS techniques include 
beamforming, artificial noise, zero-forcing [19], and convex optimization.  
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3.3.2 Beamforming 
The objective with beamforming, as it relates to PLS, is to provide the intended 
receiver Bob with a better SNR than that observed by the eavesdropper Eve. A more 
thorough discussion of beamforming is presented in the next chapter.  
3.3.3 Artificial Noise 
The technique of artificial noise entails the sender Alice generating AN and 
transmitting that noise in all directions other than in the direction of the intended receiver 
Bob. Alice can improve the overall effect of the AN on Eve if CSI for Eve’s channel is 
known to Alice, which typically does not apply in the case of a passive eavesdropper. 
Artificial noise is covered more in depth in chapter 5. 
3.3.4 Zero-Forcing 
For the ZF approach, Alice transmits the information signal into the null space of 
Eve, requiring some level of knowledge of Eve’s channel to perform the necessary 
precoding and to minimize Eve’s capacity [20]. Zero-forcing is also known as null-space 
beamforming [21]. The objective when employing ZF is to reduce to signal level 
observed at Eve to zero such that the following condition is satisfied 
 𝐡𝑒𝐰
H = 0 Eq. 3-1 
where 𝐡e represents Eve’s channel vector and 𝐰
H represents the null-space beamforming 
vector [21]. 
3.3.5 Convex Optimization 
Precoding based on CVX can be used to maximize the secrecy capacity by 
maximizing the capacity difference between Bob and Eve. It can be used along with ZF 
and AN schemes in situations where there is limited CSI [21]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BEAMFORMING: THEORY AND SIMULATION 
 
4.1 Beamforming for PLS 
In this chapter, the PLS beamforming techniques of both transmit and receive 
beamforming are further considered. MATLAB simulations of MISO and SIMO systems 
are performed, and the results analyzed. The impact on the BER experienced by a 
potential eavesdropper is demonstrated through these simulations. Also demonstrated is 
the transmitter power reduction potential of RX beamforming. 
4.2 Transmit Beamforming 
The objective with beamforming, as it relates to PLS, is to ensure the intended 
receiver Bob has a better SNR than that observed by the eavesdropper Eve [22]. In 
transmit beamforming, the signal is steered towards the desired receiver by multiplying 
the information symbols sent across each transmit antenna by the complex conjugate of 
the desired receiver’s channel. This results in the multiple signals being received at the 
desired receiver being combined in a manner that increases the receiver’s SNR [23]. 
Figure 4-1 presents the model for the masked beamformer scheme used in the TX 
beamforming simulations in this thesis. Rayleigh flat-fading is assumed.
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Figure 4-1: Transmit Beamformer Simulation Model. 
In this TX beamforming scenario, Alice uses two transmit antennas to beamform 
the information bearing signal to Bob where Bob and Eve both are employing a single 
receive antenna [23]. Alice transmits the information signal as 
 𝐱 = [
x1
x2
] =  [
a1s
a2s
] Eq. 4-1 
where 𝐱 is the transmitted signal vector containing the products of the information 
symbols and the beamforming weights generated by Alice based on Bob’s CSI 
transmitted across the corresponding transmit antenna in Alice’s multiantenna array. 
Bob’s channel matrix 𝐇 contains the complex channel coefficients h1 and h2 and 
the signal received at Bob becomes 
 y =  [h1 h2] [
x1
x2
] + n Eq. 4-2 
 
 y =  h1x1 + h2x2 + n Eq. 4-3 
 
 y =  h1a1s + h2a2s + n Eq. 4-4 
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 y =  
h1h1
∗s
|h1|
+   
h2h2
∗s
|h2|
+ n. Eq. 4-5 
Since the beamforming phase shifts are 
 a1 =
h1
∗
|h1|
 Eq. 4-6 
and 
 a2 =
h2
∗
|h2|
 Eq. 4-7 
respectively, Bob’s received signal simplifies to 
 
y = (|h1| + |h2|)s + n. 
Eq. 4-8 
4.3 Transmit Beamforming Simulation Results 
In Figure 4-2, a comparison of a SISO system with a 2 x 1 MISO system using 
transmit beamforming is presented. This simulation uses QPSK modulation and 
illustrates that transmit beamforming based on Bob’s CSI can yield an improved BER for 
Bob while Eve’s BER remains no better than that of the theoretical SISO performance. 
The resulting SNR gap between Bob and Eve supports the concept of using transmit 
beamforming to provide a measurable level of secrecy between Alice and Bob compared 
to that between Alice and Eve. The resulting plots also suggest that as the SNR values 
increase, this SNR gap continues to increase, further enhancing the potential secrecy 
available between Alice and Bob. 
29 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with SISO Theory Comparison. 
Figure 4-3 further illustrates this point. Here the BER results of both Bob and 
Eve are presented for the 2 x 1 MISO case where transmit beamforming is employed as 
well as when no beamforming is used. Eve’s performance remains the same with and 
without beamforming across the entire plotted SNR range. This is expected since the 
transmit beamforming employed by Alice is based on Bob’s CSI and, as a result, Eve 
reaps no benefit from the beamforming while Bob experiences a significant gain in 
performance from Alice’s beamforming. Again, the SNR gap yields an increasing level 
of secrecy between Alice and Bob. Eve’s BER, for example, is more than two orders of 
magnitude larger than that of Bob’s at an SNR of 20 dB.  
 
30 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with and without TX 
Beamforming. 
4.4 Receive Beamforming and MRC 
4.4.1 Receive Beamforming 
In this section, receive beamforming (i.e. receive diversity) is presented where the 
beamforming processing is performed at the receiver instead of the transmitter. Received 
signals are combined to improve the overall SNR at the receiver. A signal processing 
technique known as Maximal Ratio Combining can be used when a receiver has multiple 
antennas [24]. 
Because the receiver has multiple antennas, the receiver detects the transmitted 
signal through multiple paths [25]. The receiver processes the quality of the signals from 
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each path weighting them accordingly. The multiple signals are then co-phased before 
being summed in phase maximizing the diversity gain [26]. The resulting combined 
signals are then passed to the demodulator. The signal received on the ith antenna is 
generally defined as 
 y𝐢 = hix + ni Eq. 4-9 
where y𝐢 is the symbol received on the i
th antenna, hi represents the channel complex 
coefficients for the ith antenna’s channel, x is the original symbol transmitted, and finally 
the AWGN noise on the ith antenna is ni [24]. 
The combined signal becomes 
 𝐲 = 𝐡x +  𝐧. Eq. 4-10 
Considering the 1 x 2 MRC simulation presented in the next section, the received 
symbol vector becomes 
 𝐲 = [y1 y2]T. Eq. 4-11 
The channel for the two receive antennas becomes 
 𝐡 = [h1 h2]
T Eq. 4-12 
with the AWGN noise vector being 
 𝐧 = [n1 n2]T. Eq. 4-13 
Following equalization, the resulting symbol is given as 
 x̂ =
𝐡H𝐲
(|h1|2 + |h2|2)
=
𝐡H𝐡x
(|h1|2 + |h2|2)
+
𝐡H𝐧
(|h1|2 + |h2|2)
 Eq. 4-14 
 
which reduces to 
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 x̂ = x +
𝐡H𝐧
(|h1|2 + |h2|2)
 Eq. 4-15 
after simplifying. 
4.4.2 Maximal Ratio Combining for Reduced Transmitter Power  
With the proliferation of smaller portable IoT devices that commonly have limited 
power constraints, the possibility of employing RX beamforming techniques like MRC to 
maintain an acceptable BER at a reduced SNR is of interest.  
An MRC simulation is performed to better demonstrate the potential of using 
MRC to provide a desired BER at a lower SNR. As in the transmit beamforming 
simulations, Rayleigh flat-fading is again assumed. 
4.4.3 Maximal Ratio Combining Simulation Results 
In Figure 4-4, results from a simulation incorporating MRC is presented. The 
BER performance for an intended receiver in a 2 x 1 MISO transmit beamforming case is 
compared to a case of a 1 x 2 SIMO system using MRC. The theoretical results for a 2 x 
1 SIMO system are also plotted for comparison. The matching BER performance 
observed by the receiver from both transmit beamforming and MRC supports the theory 
that the transmitter could simply employ a single transmit antenna instead of multiple 
transmit antennas with transmit beamforming. Transmit beamforming increases the 
complexity of the transmitter resulting in increased processing requirements. A higher 
processing complexity typically means increased power consumption by the transmitter. 
The results from this simulation suggests that a receiver can leverage MRC to reduce the 
complexity at the transmitter. This approach could further increase the operational 
reliability of small IoT devices with limited battery capacity. 
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Figure 4-4: BER Simulation Plots for Maximal Ratio Combining compared to MISO 
TX Beamforming. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ARTIFICIAL NOISE: THEORY AND SIMULATION 
 
5.1 Artificial Noise for PLS 
In this chapter, the PLS technique called artificial noise generation is further 
investigated. MATLAB simulations of a MISO system with a range of power allocations 
applied to AN are performed. The impact on the BER experienced by a potential 
eavesdropper is demonstrated through these simulations. 
5.2 Artificial Noise 
The technique of artificial noise entails the sender Alice generating artificial noise 
and transmitting that noise in all directions other than in the direction of the intended 
receiver Bob. Alice can improve the overall effect of the AN on Eve if channel state 
information for Eve’s channel is known to Alice, which typically does not apply in the 
case of a passive eavesdropper. The desired result of generating AN is to degrade the 
channel of potential eavesdroppers while at the same time not impacting the quality of the 
channel of the intended receiver [27]. It is important to note that even in a scenario where 
Eve’s SNR is increased, the secrecy provided will remain since the increased SNR of Eve 
will not only provide her with a stronger information signal but with increased artificial 
noise observed by her as well. 
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Utilizing the transmit beamforming model in Figure 4.1, a series of AN 
simulations performed in this thesis make use of a precoding scheme presented in [27] 
where the sender Alice has two transmitting antennas, while the intended receiver Bob 
and the eavesdropper Eve each have a single receive antenna. Both Bob’s and Eve’s 
respective received signals are derived in this section. In these simulations, the sender 
Alice sends the signal  
 𝐱k = 𝐚k𝐬k + 𝐰k Eq. 5-1 
with 𝐱k representing the complex Gaussian symbol vector, 𝐚k is a beamforming weight, 
𝐬k being the information signal, and 𝐰k being the complex Gaussian vector of the AN 
being generated by Alice. The condition defined by  
 𝐇k
H𝐰k = 0 Eq. 5-2 
is satisfied by Alice choosing 𝐰k such that it lies within the null-space of 𝐇k
H which is the 
conjugate transpose of Bob’s channel matrix 𝐇k. 
Bob’s received signal is  
 𝐲k = 𝐇k
H𝐱k + 𝐧k Eq. 5-3 
 
 𝐲k = 𝐇k
H(𝐚k𝐬k + 𝐰k) + 𝐧k Eq. 5-4 
 
 𝐲k = 𝐇k
H𝐚k𝐬k + 𝐧k. Eq. 5-5 
As is seen, the AN-related component has disappeared in the signal received by 
Bob. In comparison, the signal observed by Eve is 
 𝐳k = 𝐆k
H𝐱k + 𝐞k Eq. 5-6 
 
 𝐳k = 𝐆k
H(𝐚k𝐬k + 𝐰k) + 𝐞k Eq. 5-7 
36 
 
 
 
 
 𝐳k = 𝐆k
H𝐚k𝐬k + 𝐆k
H𝐰k + 𝐞k Eq. 5-8 
where the AN represented by 𝐆k
H𝐰k remains in the signal received by Eve significantly 
reducing the quality of Eve’s channel 𝐆k. Bob on the other hand does not see the AN 
component since the AN vector 𝐰k lies in his null-space, conditioning the AN to impact 
potential eavesdroppers including Eve in all subspaces other than Bob’s.  
In terms of the amount of total transmission power allocated to the generation of 
AN versus the information signal, the transmitted signal is given by 
 𝐱k = √(1 − r)𝐬k + √r𝐰k Eq. 5-9 
where r is the ratio of the amplitude of the AN compared to the total amplitude of the 
transmitted signal. The AN simulation results are presented in the next section. 
5.3 Artificial Noise Simulation Results 
In Figure 5-1, the simulation results are given for a 2 x 1 Multiple Input Single 
Output system where the percentage of total transmit power allocated to AN generation is 
set at 20%. This figure shows that Eve’s BER is considerably increased from a mere 20% 
of the power being used for AN compared to her BER when no AN is generated. While 
Eve’s BER was already increasingly higher than Bob’s BER for SNR regime above 0 dB 
as a result of the TX beamforming by Alice, the complimentary effects from the presence 
of AN is shown. Eve’s BER, for instance, at an SNR of 20 dB has increased from 
approximately 10−2.5 to 10−1 and, in fact, appears to approach a limit of 10−1 for all 
SNR values above 10 dB. In Eve’s case, higher SNR values, while increasing the 
observed SNR for the information-bearing signal, the SNR of the AN is also increased 
leaving Eve without no benefit from the higher SNR regime. Bob’s BER, on the other 
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hand, is slightly affected due to the AN being generated based on Bob’s CSI. This is not 
due to the AN directly but that the portion of total transmit power allocated to the 
information-bearing signal has decreased to 80% versus 100% when no AN is generated.  
If the power allocation to AN is increased even further, as is the case in Figure 
5-2, Figure 5-3, and Figure 5-4, the BER of Eve continues to increase reaching 10−0.5 in 
the instance where the AN power allocation is 80%. However, the decreasing 
information-bearing signal power allocation also begins to impact Bob’s BER as well.  
This is highly visible in Figure 5.4 where Bob’s BER is higher than Eve’s BER when no 
AN is applied for SNR values below 10 dB.  
 
Figure 5-1: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with TX Beamforming and 
Artificial Noise at 20% of Total Transmit Power. 
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Figure 5-2: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with TX Beamforming and 
Artificial Noise at 40% of Total Transmit Power. 
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Figure 5-3: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with TX Beamforming and 
Artificial Noise at 60% of Total Transmit Power. 
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Figure 5-4: BER Simulation Plots for Bob and Eve with TX Beamforming and 
Artificial Noise at 80% of Total Transmit Power. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
The results presented in this thesis illustrated how the use of TX BF can 
substantially increase the level of secrecy of information being transmitted between a 
transmitter and an intended receiver while increasing the difficulty of interception on the 
part of an eavesdropper. 
The possibility of reduced transmitter power consumption using MRC at a 
receiver was also investigated. The simulation results observed using MATLAB suggest 
that MRC could be used as an alternative to transmit beamforming to reduce the 
processing complexity of the transmitter and in turn conserving battery power at the 
transmitter. Reduced battery consumption is especially important in the use of small 
portable battery-powered IoT devices. The number of portable IoT devices is expected to 
grow at an ever-increasing rate as the next-generation cellular 5G wireless networks 
become operational over the next several years. AN generation was investigated as well. 
Through the simulations performed and their presented results, this thesis demonstrated 
that the probability of intercept, as a result of increased BER seen by an eavesdropper, 
can be further decreased using AN. While the addition of AN does slightly degrade the 
intended receiver’s performance, the impact on the eavesdropper is much greater making 
AN a key component of a PLS security strategy.  
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6.2 Future Work 
For future work in the techniques of BF and AN, an implementation of these 
techniques in physical devices to assess their performance in an actual real world setting 
with increased interference could be performed. To perform such an implementation 
would require a pair of transceivers with MIMO arrays and the ability to modify the 
beamforming and artificial noise behavior, possibly using software-defined radio 
systems. With equipment such as SDRs, the researcher could perform actual over the air 
experimentation to compare MATLAB simulation results to measurements made using 
the SDRs. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
BEAMFORMING MATLAB CODE 
 
A.1 Transmit Beamforming Code 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% MISO No Beamforming versus Beamforming 
%  
% This MATLAB script provides a comparison between the  
% a MISO 2 x 1 simulated system's performance and that of 
% simulated Tx beamforming for a MISO 2 x 1 system containing the  
% following actors: 
% Alice (transmitter) has 2 Tx antennas 
% Bob (intended receiver) has 1 Rx antenna 
% Eve (unintended receiver i.e. eavesdropper) has 1 Rx antenna 
% [6],[23] 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Close and clear all 
clear; close all; clc; 
  
% Simulation settings 
N = 10^6;   % Total symbol count 
n = 2;  % Modulation order 
L = 2^n;    % Modulation points 
SNR_dB = -25:1:35; % SNR values (independent variable) in dB 
EsNo_dB = SNR_dB + 3 * (n - 1); % Symbol Energy-to-Noise Power in dB 
SNR_lin = 10.^(SNR_dB/10);  % Get the linear SNR 
  
% Vectors to store estimation errors 
bob_err = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
eve_err = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
bob_err_noBF = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
eve_err_noBF = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
  
% Timer to track simulation progress 
tStart = tic; 
  
% Main Simulation Loop 
for idx = 1:1:length(SNR_dB) 
     
    % Pick random channel coefficients (Alive to Bob, Alice to Eve) 
    % Flat-fading assumed    
    alice_bob_channel = repelem(reshape((randn(1,N) + 
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 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2),2,N/2),1,2); 
    alice_eve_channel = repelem(reshape((randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2),2,N/2),1,2);  
 
% QPSK Grey-coded modulation transmitted by Alice 
    x = round(rand(1,N)) + round(rand(1,N)) * 2; 
    b = reshape(dec2bin(x).',1,2 * N); 
     
    % Initialize vector to store transmitted symbol 
    s = zeros(1, N);  
    for u = 1:N 
        if x(u) == 0 
            s(u) = -1; 
        elseif x(u) == 1 
            s(u) = -1j; 
        elseif x(u) == 2 
            s(u) = 1j; 
        else 
            s(u) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
       
    % Set transmitted symbols for with and without beamforming  
    % to be the same. 
    s = repelem(s,2,1)/sqrt(2);  
    s_noBF = s; 
      
    % Create Noise for Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve channels 
    alice_bob_noise = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2); 
    alice_eve_noise = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2); 
     
    % Beamformer (Transmitter-based beamforming to Bob) 
    alice_bob_channel_eff = alice_bob_channel.*exp(-1j * 
 angle(alice_bob_channel)); 
     
    % Transmit signals through the channels 
    bob_receive = sum(alice_bob_channel_eff.*s,1) + alice_bob_noise; 
    eve_receive = sum(alice_eve_channel.*s,1) + alice_eve_noise; 
    bob_receive_noBF = sum(alice_bob_channel.*s_noBF,1) + 
 alice_bob_noise; 
    eve_receive_noBF = sum(alice_eve_channel.*s_noBF,1) + 
 alice_eve_noise; 
     
    % Equalization to Bob's channel (BF effective channel) 
    bob_s_estimate = bob_receive./sum(alice_bob_channel_eff,1); 
     
    % Intended Receiver (Bob)(without Beamforming at all)     
    bob_s_estimate_noBF = bob_receive_noBF./sum(alice_bob_channel,1);     
          
    % Make detected symbol decisions based on measured phase 
    % (Bob with BF to Bob) 
    angle_bob = 180/pi * angle(bob_s_estimate); 
    bob_x_estimate = zeros(1,N); 
45 
 
 
 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob(d) || -135 >= angle_bob(d) 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate = reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate).',1,2 * N); 
     
    % Symbol detection (Bob No BF) 
    angle_bob_noBF = 180/pi*angle(bob_s_estimate_noBF); 
    bob_x_estimate_noBF = zeros(1,N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob_noBF(d) && angle_bob_noBF(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob_noBF(d) && angle_bob_noBF(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob_noBF(d) || -135 >= angle_bob_noBF(d) 
            bob_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate_noBF = reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate_noBF).',1,2 * 
 N);     
          
    % Unintended Receiver (Eve) 
    % Equalization to Eve's channel with BF to Bob 
    eve_s_estimate = eve_receive./sum(alice_eve_channel,1);     
     
    % Unintended Receiver (Eve) 
    % Equalization with Eve's CSI without BF     
    eve_s_estimate_noBF = eve_receive_noBF./sum(alice_eve_channel,1);     
         
    % Symbol detection (Eve with BF to Bob) 
    angle_eve = 180/pi * angle(eve_s_estimate); 
    eve_x_estimate = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_eve(d) && angle_eve(d) < 45 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_eve(d) && angle_eve(d) < 135 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_eve(d) || -135 >= angle_eve(d) 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 0; 
        else 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    eve_b_estimate = reshape(dec2bin(eve_x_estimate).',1,2 * N); 
     
    % Symbol detection (Eve no BF) 
    angle_eve_noBF = 180/pi * angle(eve_s_estimate_noBF); 
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    eve_x_estimate_noBF = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_eve_noBF(d) && angle_eve_noBF(d) < 45 
            eve_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_eve_noBF(d) && angle_eve_noBF(d) < 135 
            eve_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_eve_noBF(d) || -135 >= angle_eve_noBF(d) 
            eve_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 0; 
        else 
            eve_x_estimate_noBF(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    eve_b_estimate_noBF = reshape(dec2bin(eve_x_estimate_noBF).',1,2 * 
 N);      
     
    % Count the estimation errors 
    bob_err(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate),2); 
    eve_err(idx) = size(find(b - eve_b_estimate),2); 
    bob_err_noBF(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate_noBF),2); 
    eve_err_noBF(idx) = size(find(b - eve_b_estimate_noBF),2); 
     
    % Display elapsed time 
    tElapsed = toc(tStart) 
end 
  
% Simulation results 
bob_BER = bob_err/(2 * N); 
eve_BER = eve_err/(2 * N); 
bob_BER_noBF = bob_err_noBF/(2 * N); 
eve_BER_noBF = eve_err_noBF/(2 * N); 
  
% Plot the results 
close all 
figure 
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER_noBF,'*-','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Bob)  
hold on 
semilogy(SNR_dB,eve_BER_noBF,'-ks','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Eve)  
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER,'p-g','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Bob - BF) 
semilogy(SNR_dB,eve_BER,'-r*','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Eve - BF) 
axis([-25 35 10^-5 1]) 
grid on 
title('QPSK Bit Error Rate (BER) - Beamforming vs. No Beamforming'); 
legend('Bob (nTx=2, nRx=1, no BF)','Eve (nTx=2, nRx=1, no BF)','Bob 
(nTx=2, nRx=1, Tx BF)','Eve (nTx=2, nRx=1, Tx BF)'); 
xlabel('SNR (dB)'); 
ylabel('Bit Error Rate (BER)'); 
 
A.2 Maximal Ratio Combining Code 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% MISO Transmit Beamforming versus Maximal Ratio Combining 
% i.e. Rx Beamforming 
% 
% This MATLAB script provides a comparison between the  
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% a MISO 2 x 1 simulated system's performance and that of 
% simulated Rx Beamforming for a SIMO 1 x 2 system containing the  
% following actors: 
% Alice (transmitter) has 1 Tx antenna 
% Bob (intended receiver) has 2 Rx antenna 
% [6],[23] 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Close and clear all 
clear; close all; clc; 
  
% Simulation parameters 
N = 10^6;   % Information symbols 
n = 2;  % Modulation order 
L = 2^n;    % Modulation points 
SNR_dB = -25:1:35; % SNR values (independent variable) in dB 
EsNo_dB = SNR_dB + 3 * (n - 1); % Symbol Energy-to-Noise Power in dB 
SNR_lin = 10.^(SNR_dB/10);  % Get the linear SNR 
nRx = 2;    % Number of Rx antennas for MRC simulation 
  
% Vector to store estimation errors 
bob_err = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
  
% Timer to track simulation progress 
tStart = tic; 
  
% Main MISO Simulation Loop 
for idx = 1:1:length(SNR_dB) 
     
    % Pick random channel coefficients (Alive to Bob) 
    % Flat-fading assumed    
    alice_bob_channel = repelem(reshape((randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2),2,N/2),1,2); 
     
    % QPSK Grey-coded modulation transmitted by Alice 
    x = round(rand(1,N)) + round(rand(1,N)) * 2; 
    b = reshape(dec2bin(x).',1,2 * N); 
     
    % Initialize vector to store transmitted symbols 
    s = zeros(1,N);  
    for u = 1:N 
        if x(u) == 0 
            s(u) = -1; 
        elseif x(u) == 1 
            s(u) = -1j; 
        elseif x(u) == 2 
            s(u) = 1j; 
        else 
            s(u) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    % Copy symbols vector for use in MRC simulation below 
    s_mrc = s; 
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    % Set transmitted symbols  
    s = repelem(s,2,1)/sqrt(2); 
      
    % Create Noise for Alice to Bob channel 
    alice_bob_noise = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2); 
     
    % Beamformer (Transmitter-based beamforming to Bob) 
    alice_bob_channel_eff = alice_bob_channel.*exp(-
 1j*angle(alice_bob_channel)); 
     
    % Received signal 
    bob_receive = sum(alice_bob_channel_eff.*s,1) + alice_bob_noise; 
     
    % Equalization to Bob's channel (BF effective channel) 
    bob_s_estimate = bob_receive./sum(alice_bob_channel_eff,1);  
          
    % Make detected symbol decisions based on measured phase 
    % (Bob with BF to Bob) 
    angle_bob = 180/pi * angle(bob_s_estimate); 
    bob_x_estimate = zeros(1,N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob(d) || -135 >= angle_bob(d) 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate = reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate).',1,2*N);        
        
    % Count estimation errors 
    bob_err(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate),2); 
     
    % Display elapsed time 
    tElapsed = toc(tStart) 
end 
  
% Main SIMO (MRC) Simulation Loop 
for idx = 1:1:length(SNR_dB) 
     
    % Pick random channel coefficients (Alive to Bob) 
    % Flat-fading assumed 
    alice_bob_channel_mrc = (randn(nRx,N) + randn(nRx,N)*1j)/sqrt(2); 
       
    % Create Noise for Alice to Bob channel 
    alice_bob_noise_mrc = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(nRx,N) + 
 randn(nRx,N)*1j)/sqrt(2);   
      
    % Received signal 
    sd_mrc = kron(ones(nRx,1),s_mrc); 
    bob_receive_mrc = alice_bob_channel_mrc.*sd_mrc + 
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 alice_bob_noise_mrc; 
     
    % Equalization Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC) 
    bob_s_estimate_mrc = sum(conj(alice_bob_channel_mrc).* 
 bob_receive_mrc,1)./sum(alice_bob_channel_mrc.*conj(alice_bob_cha
 nnel_mrc),1); 
          
    % Make detected symbol decisions based on measured phase 
    % (Bob SIMO) 
    angle_bob_mrc = 180/pi * angle(bob_s_estimate_mrc); 
    bob_x_estimate_mrc = zeros(1,N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob_mrc(d) && angle_bob_mrc(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate_mrc(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob_mrc(d) && angle_bob_mrc(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate_mrc(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob_mrc(d) || -135 >= angle_bob_mrc(d) 
            bob_x_estimate_mrc(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate_mrc(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate_mrc = reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate_mrc).',1,2 * 
 N); 
                
    % Count the estimation errors 
    bob_err_nRx2(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate_mrc),2); 
     
    % Display elapsed time 
    tElapsed = toc(tStart) 
end 
  
% Theoretical Results 
p = 1/2 - (1 + 1./SNR_lin).^(-1/2)/2; 
theory_BER_nRx2 = p.^2.*(1 + 2 * (1 - p)); 
  
% Simulation results 
bob_BER = bob_err/(2 * N); 
bob_BER_nRx2 = bob_err_nRx2/(2 * N); 
  
% Plot results 
close all 
figure 
semilogy(SNR_dB,theory_BER_nRx2,'s-','LineWidth',2); % SIMO MRC theory  
hold on 
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER,'p-g','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Bob - BF) 
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER_nRx2,'o-r','LineWidth',2); % Bob SIMO MRC sim  
axis([-25 35 10^-5 1]) 
grid on 
title('QPSK Bit Error Rate (BER) - Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC)'); 
legend('SIMO (MRC nTx=1, nRx=2) theory','MISO (nTx=2, nRx=1, Tx BF) 
sim','SIMO (MRC nTx=1, nRx=2) sim'); 
xlabel('SNR (dB)'); 
ylabel('Bit Error Rate (BER)'); 
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APPENDIX B  
 
ARTIFICIAL NOISE MATLAB CODE 
 
B.1 Artificial Noise Code 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% MISO Tx Beamforming With Artificial Noise (20%) 
% 
% This MATLAB script provides a simulation of the Bit Error Rate 
% (BER) response of both an intended and an unintended receiver 
% using a MISO 2 x 1 Tx Beamforming system with 20% of the total  
% transmitted power used to generate artificial noise. 
% The actors are the following: 
% Alice (transmitter) has 2 Tx antennas 
% Bob (intended receiver) has 1 Rx antenna 
% Eve (unintended receiver i.e. eavesdropper) has 1 Rx antenna 
% [6],[23] 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  
% Close and clear all 
clear; close all; clc; 
  
% Simulation settings 
N = 10^6;   % Total symbol count 
n = 2;  % Modulation order 
L = 2^n;    % Modulation points 
SNR_dB = -25:1:35; % SNR values (independent variable) in dB 
EsNo_dB = SNR_dB + 3 * (n - 1); % Symbol Energy-to-Noise in dB 
SNR_lin = 10.^(SNR_dB/10);  % Get the linear SNR 
Ran = 0.2; % Ratio of Artificial Noise to Total Power 
  
% Initialize vectors to store estimation errors 
bob_err = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
eve_err = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
bob_err_noAN = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
eve_err_noAN = zeros(1, length(SNR_dB)); 
  
% Timer to track simulation progress 
tStart = tic; 
  
% Main Simulation Loop 
for idx = 1:1:length(SNR_dB) 
     
    % Pick random channel coefficients (Alive to Bob, Alice to Eve) 
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    % Flat-fading assumed    
    alice_bob_channel = repelem(reshape((randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2),2,N/2),1,2); 
    alice_eve_channel = repelem(reshape((randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2),2,N/2),1,2);    
      
    % QPSK Grey-coded modulation transmitted by Alice 
    x = round(rand(1,N)) + round(rand(1,N)) * 2; 
    b = reshape(dec2bin(x).',1,2 * N); 
     
    % Initialize vector to store transmitted symbols 
    s = zeros(1, N);  
    for u = 1:N 
        if x(u) == 0 
            s(u) = -1; 
        elseif x(u) == 1 
            s(u) = -1j; 
        elseif x(u) == 2 
            s(u) = 1j; 
        else 
            s(u) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    % Set transmitted symbols for with and without artificial noise  
    % to be the same. 
    s = repelem(s,2,1)/sqrt(2); 
    s_noAN = s; 
     
    % Create Noise for Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve channels 
    alice_bob_noise = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2); 
    alice_eve_noise = 10^(-EsNo_dB(idx)/20) * (randn(1,N) + 
 randn(1,N)*1j)/sqrt(2);  
     
    % Beamformer (Transmitter-based beamforming to Bob) 
    alice_bob_channel_eff = alice_bob_channel.*exp(-
 1j*angle(alice_bob_channel)); 
     
    % Artificial noise based on Bob's channel 
    for i = 1:N 
        w(:,i) = null(alice_bob_channel_eff(:,i).'); 
    end 
    s = sqrt(1 - Ran)*s + sqrt(Ran)*w;     
       
    % Received signals 
    bob_receive = sum(alice_bob_channel_eff.*s,1) + 
alice_bob_noise; 
    eve_receive = sum(alice_eve_channel.*s,1) + alice_eve_noise; 
    bob_receive_noAN = sum(alice_bob_channel_eff.*s_noAN,1) + 
 alice_bob_noise; 
    eve_receive_noAN = sum(alice_eve_channel.*s_noAN,1) + 
 alice_eve_noise;     
     
    % Equalization to Bob's channel (BF effective channel) 
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    bob_s_estimate = bob_receive./sum(alice_bob_channel_eff,1); 
     
    % Intended Receiver (Bob)(without artificial noise)     
    bob_s_estimate_noAN = 
 bob_receive_noAN./sum(alice_bob_channel_eff,1); 
         
    % Symbol decisions (Bob with AN) 
    angle_bob = 180/pi * angle(bob_s_estimate); 
    bob_x_estimate = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob(d) && angle_bob(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob(d) || -135 >= angle_bob(d) 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate = reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate).',1,2*N); 
     
    % Symbol decisions (Bob No AN) 
    angle_bob_noAN = 180/pi * angle(bob_s_estimate_noAN); 
    bob_x_estimate_noAN = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_bob_noAN(d) && angle_bob_noAN(d) < 45 
            bob_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_bob_noAN(d) && angle_bob_noAN(d) < 135 
            bob_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_bob_noAN(d) || -135 >= angle_bob_noAN(d) 
            bob_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 0; 
        else 
            bob_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    bob_b_estimate_noAN = 
 reshape(dec2bin(bob_x_estimate_noAN).',1,2*N);      
           
    % Unintended Receiver (Eve) 
    % Equalization to Eve's channel with AN 
    eve_s_estimate = eve_receive./sum(alice_eve_channel,1); 
     
    % Unintended Receiver (Eve) 
    % Equalization with Eve's channel without AN     
    eve_s_estimate_noAN = eve_receive_noAN./sum(alice_eve_channel,1);      
     
    % Symbol decisions (Eve with AN) 
    angle_eve = 180/pi * angle(eve_s_estimate); 
    eve_x_estimate = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_eve(d) && angle_eve(d) < 45 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_eve(d) && angle_eve(d) < 135 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_eve(d) || -135 >= angle_eve(d) 
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            eve_x_estimate(d) = 0; 
        else 
            eve_x_estimate(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    eve_b_estimate = reshape(dec2bin(eve_x_estimate).',1,2 * N);   
     
    % Symbol decisions (Eve no AN) 
    angle_eve_noAN = 180/pi * angle(eve_s_estimate_noAN); 
    eve_x_estimate_noAN = zeros(1, N); 
    for d = 1:N 
        if -45 <= angle_eve_noAN(d) && angle_eve_noAN(d) < 45 
            eve_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 3; 
        elseif 45 <= angle_eve_noAN(d) && angle_eve_noAN(d) < 135 
            eve_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 2; 
        elseif 135 <= angle_eve_noAN(d) || -135 >= angle_eve_noAN(d) 
            eve_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 0; 
        else 
            eve_x_estimate_noAN(d) = 1; 
        end 
    end 
    eve_b_estimate_noAN = reshape(dec2bin(eve_x_estimate_noAN).',1,2 * 
 N);     
  
    % Count estimation errors 
    bob_err(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate),2); 
    eve_err(idx) = size(find(b - eve_b_estimate),2); 
    bob_err_noAN(idx) = size(find(b - bob_b_estimate_noAN),2);  
    eve_err_noAN(idx) = size(find(b - eve_b_estimate_noAN),2);     
     
    % Display elapsed time 
    tElapsed = toc(tStart) 
end 
  
% Simulation results 
bob_BER = bob_err/(2 * N); 
eve_BER = eve_err/(2 * N); 
bob_BER_noAN = bob_err_noAN/(2 * N); 
eve_BER_noAN = eve_err_noAN/(2 * N); 
  
% Plot results 
close all 
figure 
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER_noAN,'*-','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Bob)  
hold on 
semilogy(SNR_dB,eve_BER_noAN,'-ks','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Eve)  
semilogy(SNR_dB,bob_BER,'p-g','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Bob - AN) 
semilogy(SNR_dB,eve_BER,'-rx','LineWidth',2); % MISO (Eve - AN) 
axis([-25 35 10^-5 1]) 
grid on 
title('QPSK Bit Error Rate (BER) - Artificial Noise (20%) and Tx 
Beamforming'); 
legend('Bob (nTx=2, nRx=1, Tx BF)','Eve (nTx=2, nRx=1, Tx BF)','Bob 
(nTx=2, nRx=1, AN and Tx BF)','Eve (nTx=2, nRx=1, AN and Tx BF)'); 
xlabel('SNR (dB)'); 
ylabel('Bit Error Rate (BER)'); 
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